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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEPHEN GUY TERRELL by and
through his successor Guardian ad Litem
GLAYDE EDWARDS,
Trial Court No. 020700057
Appellate Court No. 20040829-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
JACK E. McBRIDE and
EDNA S. McBRIDE,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court,
in and for Millard County, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2004). R. at 224.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Was the trial court ruling granting an easement to Plaintiff on the
East Road clearly erroneous, when its findings are clearly supported by the record and the
trial court carefully weighed the evidence presented to it?
Standard of Review:

"For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must

decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by

1

the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court's determination;5 State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994) (overruled for
other reasons); and In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to Use All of
the Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and
Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, and Juab Counties in
Utah v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co. and Pinecrest Water Users Ass., 2004 UT 67, f
33,98P.3dl.
Issue No. 2: Was the ruling of the trial court denying damages to Plaintiff clearly
erroneous, when the trial court's decision was clearly supported by the record?
Standard of Review:

The adequacy of a trial court's award of damages is a

question of fact, and "[b]ecause the adequacy of damages is a question of fact, [a
reviewing court] cannot overturn the trial court's findings unless they are clearly
erroneous." In re Estate of Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this
appeal:
1.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9).
" A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence
that supports the challenged finding
"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff and Appellant, Stephen Guy Terrell, by and through his Guardian ad
Litem Clark Walters Terrell, filed a Verified Complaint in this matter against Defendants
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and Appellees, Jack E. McBride and Edna S. McBride, on or about May 15, 2002. R. at
1-11. In the Verified Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to a declaration of
public access across the roads on Defendants' property; that Plaintiff was entitled to an
easement by way of necessity or by implication across these roads; that Plaintiff was
entitled to an easement by prescription across these roads; and that Defendants had
committed forcible detainer. R. at 1-7. Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs
Verified Complaint on August 15,2002 denying Plaintiffs allegations. R. at 14-24.
A bench trial was held on March 4, 2004 and March 29, 2004 before the
Honorable Donald J. Eyre. R. at 154. At the end of trial, the parties submitted separate
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. at 51-143. The trial court issued its ruling
on May 10, 2004. R. at 144-153. The trial court granted an easement to Plaintiff along
what is known as the East Road and denied all other relief. R. at 166-167. No damages
were awarded. Id. and R. at 163-164: f 7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were signed on August 19, 2004. R. at 154-165. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on
September 15,2004. R. at 171.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is the owner of the real property in this matter, a 40-acre parcel of real
property. Plaintiffs Exhibit ("P Ex.") 1 and R. at 144: 1. Said property was acquired by
Plaintiffs family in 1955. Id. This property was in turn transferred to Plaintiff in 1998.
Id. Defendant Jack E. McBride acquired a 1/5 interest in his family's property that
borders Plaintiffs in 1991. R. at 526: 12-15. Defendant Jack E. McBride acquired the
rest of the property later. R. at 526: 18-19. Defendants' property borders Plaintiffs
3

property on the north, east and west. R. at 455: 5-19, and P Ex's 8-13. Doyle Mitchell
owns the property bordering the southern portion of Plaintiff s property. R. at 455: 1116. As a result, Plaintiffs property is landlocked. P Ex.'s 8-13.
There are three roads on Defendants' property that could conceivably serve as an
easement by necessity. R. at 145-147. The first road comes to Plaintiffs property from
the east ("East Road"). R. at 512: 1-5 and P Ex.'s 8-13. The East Road comes off of
McBride Lane and leads to the northeast corner of Plaintiff s property. Id. In 1955,
when Plaintiff acquired his property, this road served as the primary access to Plaintiffs
propertyuntil about 1970. R. at 512: 1-5, P Ex.'s 8-13 and R. at 513: 9-13. In 1970 a
dairy was built across a portion of the East Road. R. at 513: 14-16. However, while the
original path of the road was altered by the dairy, it was rerouted, and still provides
access to Plaintiffs property. R. at 513: 17-23. That road is still being used and is a
good road. R. at 513: 24-25 and 514: 1. In fact one can travel 20 miles per hour, and
witness Alison Robison has seen cars and bigger trucks traveling the road frequently. R.
at 484: 8-10, 490:11-19 and 491: 9-11. The next road is north of a large gravel pit on
Defendants' property ("North West Road"). R. at 147:112 and P Ex's 8-13. However,
this road had fallen into disrepair and would require a fair amount of work to allow
adequate travel. Id., R. at 535: 11-25 and R. at 536: 1-2.
The final road comes off of State Road 100, along the western border or
Defendants' property and is graded. ("Gravel Pit Road"). Defendants' Exhibits (D Ex.)
24 and 25. This road continues until it reaches the large gravel pit located on
Defendants' property. R. at 514: 12-14 and P Ex's 8-13. The portion of the Gravel Pit
4

Road that moves through the gravel pit changes and is not defined. R. at 522: 2-10. At
the end of the gravel pit, the Gravel Pit Road is rough and it would be extremely difficult
to move vehicles from the road onto Plaintiffs property. R. at 491: 23-25,492: 1-10,
536: 1-2 and 537: 1-13.
Defendant Jack E. McBride has had problems with trespassers on his property. R.
at 508: 12-13 and 518: 11-17. These trespassers include Plaintiff. R. at 504: 21-25.
These problems have occurred despite the fact that Defendants have gone to great lengths
to keep uninvited parties off their property, including gates and locks along the property
and no trespassing signs. R. at 515: 1-21,499: 1-21 and 517: 18-20. Defendants have
also had problems with individuals stealing sand and gravel from their gravel pit located
on the property. R. at 529: 5-6 and 538: 2-6. Millard County held a hearing when
tensions escalated regarding trespassing on Defendants' property. R. at 518: 6-19. After
the County's determination, it was clear that if unauthorized individuals were on the
Gravel Pit Road, they were trespassing. R. at 520: 1-4 and D Ex. 26.
Defendants would suffer devaluation to their property if an easement were placed
on the Gravel Pit Road since the easement would go through the middle of Defendants'
property. R. at 539: 6-11. The disrepair of the North West Road, and the portion of the
Gravel Pit Road from the pit, render these two roads unsuitable to satisfy Plaintiffs
stated purpose of conducting mining operations and the hauling of sand and gravel. See
Br. of Aplt. at 12 and R. at 491: 23-25,492: 1-10 and R. at 147: f 12. The East Road
however, is a good road, providing access to Plaintiffs property, with minimal burden to
Defendants' property and without the limitations and problems associated with the
5

Gravel Pit Road. R. at 513: 24-25, 514: 1, 146: % 10, 147:ffll10-12, 157:110, 158: ffl[
11-12, and 1 6 3 ^ 5 .
Despite Plaintiffs purported intent to conduct mining and hauling operations on
his property, he has not taken any substantial steps to engage in these activities.
Specifically, Plaintiff had not made provisions for tanks, communication lines, pipelines,
processing plants, or reservoirs; nor had Plaintiff determined if he would be removing
enough mineral or rock products from his property to qualify as commercial quantities;
neither had Plaintiff conducted any preliminary analysis to determine what amount, if
any, is necessaiy to post a bond for reclamation purposes. R. at 429-433, 472-476.
Further, Plaintiff did not enter into any agreements with any person or entity to sell the
sand, gravel, or other minerals that may be located on his property. R. at 466: 24-25 and
467: 1-3. Nor has anyone been to Plaintiffs property, and determined what the costs for,
or possibility of, moving trucks on and off of Plaintiff s property would be. See R. at
471: 10-20. In addition, in order to remove sand and gravel or conduct mining operations
on Plaintiffs property, a conditional use permit would be required from Millard County
since Plaintiffs property is located in a Range and Forest Zone. See R. at 474. However,
at the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an
application for a conditional use permit with the Millard County Planning and Zoning
Administrator's office to mine minerals on Plaintiffs property or to take sand and gravel
from his property. See R. at 475-476. Plaintiff complains that he had obtained materials
to build structures on the property. However, Plaintiff, or anyone on Plaintiffs behalf,
filed an application for a building permit with Millard County. See R. 476 and 478: 7-13.
6

Plaintiff did not present any evidence regarding the spoilage of, or damage to, the
materials purchased by Plaintiff.
*

*

*

At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court granted an easement by
necessity to Plaintiff along the East Road. R. at 166-167. The trial court made its
determination after considering what was reasonably necessary to Plaintiff and what
would present the least amount of burden to Defendants. R. at 146: f 10, 147:ffif10-11,
157: % 10, 158:ffif11-12, and 163: Tf 5. The trial court also found that no damages could
be awarded because Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to engage
in the mining and hauling activities he intended to perform on his property. R. at 163164:17.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court's ruling granting an easement by
necessity along the East Road was clearly erroneous, and that the trial court's ruling to
deny Plaintiff damages was also clearly erroneous. See Br. of Aplt. at 2. Plaintiffs
arguments fail, quite simply, because there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the trial court's ultimate decision. Throughout much of Plaintiff s brief, Plaintiff
accomplishes little more than pointing to instances where there was contradictory
evidence presented at trial, that ultimately was not resolved in Plaintiffs favor.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court failed to consider what was reasonably
necessary and convenient to Plaintiffs estate, considering only what was burdensome to
Defendants' estate. See Br. of Aplt. at 7. However, there are several instances in the
7

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Ruling where the trial court explicitly
considered what would be reasonable necessary to Plaintiffs estate. It should be noticed
that one of Plaintiff s arguments actually acknowledges one of these explicit findings.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court's finding that the East Road was the most
traversed road was clearly erroneous because: (a) there was insufficient evidence to
support such a finding; (b) there was inadequate foundation for evidence presented; (c)
there are alleged contradictions in testimony given by one of Plaintiff s witnesses; and (d)
there is evidence indicating the East Road is not the most traversed road. See Br. of Aplt.
at 8-12. First, Plaintiff fails to disclose all of the evidence contained in the record that
would support the trial court's finding. Second, there was adequate foundation laid for
both Defendant Jack E. McBride and witness Ansel Alison Robison to testify that the
East Road is the most traversed road. Plaintiff also failed to object to this testimony at
trial and does not argue plain error on appeal. Third, the alleged contradictions in Mr.
Robison's testimony do not exist. Finally, the other evidence that Plaintiff cites to
indicates nothing more than that there was contradictory evidence presented at trial.
Plaintiff falls well short of satisfying the strict standard for overturning a trial court's
findings.
Plaintiff further argues that the evidence presented at trial indicates that the Gravel
Pit Road is the only road that could provide reasonable access to Plaintiffs property. See
Br. of Aplt. at 12. However, Plaintiff fails once again to muster the evidence necessary to
show that the finding of the trial court was clearly erroneous. There is ample evidence in
the record to support the trial court's finding.
8

Plaintiff claims that the trial court committed clear error in finding that there
would be too great a burden to Defendants' estate if the easement were granted on
another road besides the East Road. See Br. of Aplt. at 14. Plaintiffs argument in this
regard fails for the same reason noted above. Specifically, Plaintiff has not mustered the
evidence necessary to satisfy his burden of proving the finding is clearly erroneous.
Finally, Plaintiffs argument that the trial court's denial of damages was clearly
erroneous fails as well. See Br. of Aplt. at 17. Plaintiff presented evidence at trial that he
had purchased equipment and other materials to place on his property and begin some
type of mining or hauling of sand and gravel operations. However, Plaintiff failed to get
any necessary permits to conduct these activities, and had not entered into any contracts
for the removal of sand and gravel, or the sale of mined minerals. Nor did Plaintiff show
that the equipment and materials were somehow damaged or unusable. The trial court's
conclusion to not award damages is clearly supported by the record.
ARGUMENT1
L

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING AN EASEMENT BY
NECESSITY TO THE PLAINTIFF ON THE EAST ROAD WAS NOT
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS SINCE THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED
BOTH WHAT WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY AND CONVENIENT
TO THE DOMINANT ESTATE AND WHAT WOULD BE THE LEAST
BURDENSOME TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE.
Plaintiff argues essentially that the trial court only considered what was

convenient to the servient estate, without considering what was reasonably necessary and

1

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the argument section
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9). Plaintiffs brief is void of any proper citation to the record.
9

convenient to the dominant estate. However, examination of the record shows many
instances where it is clear that the trial court did in fact consider what was reasonably
necessary and convenient to the dominant estate.
Whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to an easement by necessity is not at issue in
this appeal, but rather, the placement of that easement. Since Plaintiff is alleging clear
error, the following standard of review must be applied, specifically, "[f]or a reviewing
court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are
not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court's determination." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-936. Further,
under this clear error standard, Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made'." Power Systems & Controls, Inc. v. Keith's
Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); quoting In re T.R.F., 760 P.2d
906,90(UtahCt.App. 1988).2
With regard to placement of easements by necessity, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that "[i]n construing any grant of right of way the use, in character and extent, is
limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as
little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use contemplated." Morris v.
Blunt, 161 P. 1127,1133 (Utah 1916); See also Wade v. Bonus, 173 P. 564, 566 (Utah
1918) (where the Utah Supreme Court narrowly construed a conveyance of land

2

The same standard is cited several times in Defendants' brief because Plaintiffs
arguments allege clear error throughout. It is not Defendants' intention to be redundant.
10

providing ingress and egress). Stated simply, the fact that Plaintiff is entitled to an
easement does not give Plaintiff the right to pick and choose any location for that
easement. In light of the clear standard awarding deference to the trial court's findings of
fact, and that the record has many instances where the trial court correctly weighed the
burden to the servient estate and what was reasonably necessary and convenient to the
dominant estate, this Court should uphold the decision of the trial court placing the
easement on the East Road.
First, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court in this matter
are replete with instances where due consideration was given to what was convenient and
reasonably necessary to the dominant estate. Paragraph 10 of the findings of fact
discusses the Gravel Pit Road's suitability as an easement and ultimately concludes that
because that road constantly changes, and the portion of the road leading onto Plaintiffs
property was in poor condition, "[i]t would be extremely difficult to move a front-end
loader or truck from Defendants' sand and gravel pit up to Plaintiffs property on the
particular road." R. at 157:1f 10. Further, in Paragraph 11 the trial court noted that "[a]
substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road through
Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and
trucks Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West comer
of Plaintiffs property." R. at 158: f 11. With regard to the North West Road, the trial
court stated in Paragraph 12 that "[tjhat road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has not
served as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962
to 1963, when the Gravel Pit Road was built. It would require a fair amount of work be
11

done to allow the large trucks and equipment that Plaintiff will need to bring onto his
property to conduct mining operations." R. at 158: % 12. In the conclusions of law, the
trial court stated in Paragraph 5 that the East Road is the best road "because it is the most
traversed road," and then proceeded to weigh explicitly some of the burdens to the
servient estate. See R. at 163: ^ 5.
Second, the Ruling of the trial court also considers which road would be the most
reasonable and convenient to Plaintiffs property in light of the burdens to Defendants'
property. Specifically, Paragraphs 10 and 11 discuss the condition of the Gravel Pit and
North West roads, and the extensive work that would have to be done to make these
roads suitable for Plaintiffs proposed activities. See R. at 146-147. Not surprisingly, the
trial court's ultimate decision is the same one discussed previously above in Paragraph 5
of the conclusions of law. See R. at 151.
Third, in Plaintiffs Point II, Plaintiff argues that the trial court committed clear
error when it found that the East Road was the most traversed road of the three roads
where an easement could have been placed. See Br. of Aplt. at 8-12. Plaintiffs
argument would appear to be focused upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered by the trial court. Specifically, Paragraph 5 of the trial court's conclusions of law
states in part, "[i]n this case, the evidence presented was that the East Road is the
roadway that would provide the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs estate and the least
burden to Defendants' estate because it is the most traversed road

" R. at 163: f 5.

Plaintiffs own brief acknowledges findings made by the trial court which considered the
reasonableness and convenience to the dominant estate.
12

The trial court noted in its ruling that conflicting evidence and testimony was
presented by the parties. The trial court ultimately resolved these conflicts in favor of the
Defendants. It is the explicit province of the trial court to weigh the evidence and resolve
disputes of fact since the trial court judge is "considered to be in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record." Pena, 869 P.2d
at 936. The Utah Supreme Court has gone on to state "[t]he existence of contradictory
evidence does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict/' and "[t]he fact finder is free to
weigh the conflicting evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions." State v.
Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781-782 (Utah 1986). Finally, the duty of Plaintiff is clear, "[a]
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Plaintiff has failed to do so. As a result,
this Court should disregard Plaintiffs contention that the trial court failed to make any
findings as to the reasonableness and convenience to the dominant estate when it selected
the East Road as the appropriate road for an easement.
A.

THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE EAST ROAD IS THE MOST TRAVERSED ROAD OF THE
THREE ROADS THAT WERE CONSIDERED FOR PLACEMENT OF
THE EASEMENT AT ISSUE.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court committed clear error in finding that the East

Road was the most traversed road. See Br. of Aplt. at 8-12. Since Plaintiff alleges clear
error, Plaintiffs argument must be examined under the standard set forth by the Utah
Supreme Court stating "[f]or a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the
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factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination.''' Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-936. Again, under this clear error standard,
Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' or
the appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made'." Power Systems & Controls, Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). In addition, the mere fact that there is contradictory evidence does
not give a reviewing court the right to overturn a trial court's decision since the trial court
"is free to weigh the conflicting evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions."
Pierce, 111 P.2d at 782. Finally, since Plaintiff is challenging a finding of the trial court,
Plaintiff "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Since the record contains adequate evidence providing a basis
for the trial court's finding, and all Plaintiff can show, is that there were, not surprisingly,
contradictions in the evidence presented at trial and that the trial court resolved those
contradictions, in favor of Defendants, this Court must allow the trial court's finding to
stand. Each of Plaintiff s contentions on this point will be dealt with in turn below.
1.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT DISCLOSED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD THAT SUPPORTS THE FACT THAT THE EAST ROAD IS
THE MOST TRAVERSED ROAD.
Plaintiff has understated the amount of evidence that was supplied regarding the

suitability of the East Road. While not an exhaustive list, the following also was
provided to the trial court. Mr. Robison stated that he had "seen people travel [the East
Road] all the time." R. at 490: 12-13. Further, that he had seen cars, pickups, or bigger
14

trucks using the East Road. See R. at 490: 14-19. Also, when asked if there was a road
coming from the east, Mr. Robison answered "[t]here's a good road." R. at 483: 20-22.
When describing the East Road before part of it was blocked by the dairy, Defendant
Jack McBride stated that when individuals would travel to Plaintiffs property that was
done by traveling on the East Road. See R. at 512: 1-5. Mr. McBride went on to testify
that there is still access to Plaintiffs property on the East Road, stating "[t]here's the
McBride Lane over here and this . . . gravel pit around here this road and back to
Terrell's property." R. at 513: 21-23. Finally, Mr. McBride testified that the East Road
is "[w]ell used. It's a good road." R. at 513: 24-25 and 514:1. Clearly Plaintiff has not
presented all evidence supporting the view that the East Road was the most traversed
road. Finally, even if Plaintiff had presented all evidence supporting the trial court's
finding that the East Road was the most traversed road, it is not the quantity of evidence
that ultimately determines whether the trial court was correct, it is the quality of the
evidence that was presented.
2.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT NO FOUNDATION WAS LAID FOR
THE STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANT JACK McBRIDE AND ALISON
ROBINSON REGARDING THE USE OF THE EAST ROAD SHOULD BE
DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
OBJECT TO THESE COMMENTS, AND ADEQUATE FOUNDATION
WAS IN FACT SUPPLIED.
Plaintiff next argues that there was no foundation for the testimony of Defendant

Jack McBride and Ansel Alison Robison that the East Road was "well used" or "well
traveled." See Br. of Aplt. at 9. Initially, it should be noted that Plaintiffs counsel failed
to object to the testimony described in Plaintiffs brief. The Utah Supreme Court has
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stated "[a]s a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be made in order to
preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-821 (Utah 1989), citing
Utah R. Evid. 103(a). Further, "[ajbsent a timely objection, we will review an alleged
error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain error'." Id, at 821,
citing Utah R. Evid. 103(d); State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989); and State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff has not argued that plain error existed in
Plaintiffs brief. Therefore, Plaintiffs failure to timely object, assuming arguendo that
there was indeed a lack of foundation, must result in Plaintiffs argument being
disregarded. However, there was adequate foundation. Before Mr. Robison made his
statement that the East Road was well traveled, that it could be traveled at 20 miles per
hour, and that it was less steep than the West Road, Defendants' Counsel asked if Mr.
Robison had been on that road within the last month, to which Mr. Robison responded
"yes." R. at 484: 3-4. Further, with regard to Mr. McBride it was established that he
owned the property at issue and was extremely familiar with the geography of the area
and had been on the property. R. at 511, 512, 513, and 514: 1-7. Therefore, adequate
foundation was laid.
3.

THE TESTIMONY OF MR. ROBISON THAT PLAINTIFF CLAIMS
CONTROVERTS EVIDENCE THAT THE EAST ROAD IS THE MOST
TRAVERSED ROAD HAS BEEN TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT, IS
IRRELEVANT, OR UNHELPFUL TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT.
Plaintiff points to alleged controvertions in Mr. Robison's testimony. However,

Plaintiff has merely pulled excerpts of testimony from the record out of context to create
an issue that, upon more careful and thorough examination of the record, does not exist.
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Further, Plaintiff has pointed to contested points of the transcript that were weighed by
the trial court and came out in Defendants' favor. Plaintiff argues that "Robison
controverted his own testimony by later describing the East Road (for hunting purposes)
as the 'road that don't exist'." Br. of Aplt. at 10 & R. at 489: 18-19. What Mr. Robison
was referring to was that a portion of the East Road had been cut off by a dairy that had
been built across the road. After the excerpt cited by Plaintiff, Mr. Robison was asked
"Okay. The one that doesn't exist anymore?" R. at 489: 18-20. Mr. Robison responded
"Well, at the east end don't exist." R. at 489: 21. Earlier testimony by Mr. Robison also
affirms that there remains an unblocked road from the East. Mr. Robison described that
road as "[t]he road comes off of what is called McBride Lane. And Carling equipment is
mining gravel out of there now. Follows a southwesterly path back to the Terrell
property/' and further that the road is "a good road." R. at 483: 16-19, 22. Testimony by
Defendant Jack McBride also confirms that Mr. Robison was referring to a portion of the
East Road cut off, and further elaborates that the East Road continues around the dairy.
Specifically, Mr. McBride's testimony stated that the East Road had been used until 1970
when the dairy was built. See R. at 513: 11-16. Mr. McBride was then asked if there was
still access to Plaintiffs property. See R. at 513: 17-18. Mr. McBride answered "There's
the McBride Lane over here and this . . . gravel pit around here this road and back to
Terrell's property." R. at 513: 21-23. Mr. McBride was then asked if the road was still
in use and answered "Yes. Well used. It's a good road." R. at 513: 24-25 and 514:1. In
light of the evidence described above, it is clear that Mr. Robison did not controvert his
own testimony.
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Plaintiff also incorrectly argues it is significant that Mr. Robison stated he had
never seen any equipment on the East Road but has identified heavy equipment on the
Gravel Pit Road; acknowledged that he had traveled the Gravel Pit Road thirty or forty
times, but had been on the East Road only twice; and that when Mr. Robison hauled
gravel from Defendants' gravel pit, he used the Gravel Pit Road. See Br. of Aplt. at 10 &
R. at 491: 12-16, 486: 1-3, and 515-516. None of these statements are relevant to
Plaintiffs contention that Robison has controverted his testimony, or that the East Road
is not the most traversed. For example, Plaintiff points to the fact that Mr. Robison
removed gravel from Defendants' gravel pit and subsequently used the Gravel Pit Road
for ingress and egress to the gravel pit. See Br. of Aplt. at 10. However, the significance
that Plaintiff is reaching for is unclear. Why would Mr. Robison use the East Road when
it does not even pass by McBride's gravel pit and the shortest distance to the gravel pit is
the Gravel Pit Road?
Next, Plaintiff attempts to draw some significance from Mr. Robison's statement
that Mr. Robison had seen people on the East Road from his farm that was "a mile and an
[sic] half or two miles" away. See Br. of Aplt. at 10 & R. at 491: 8. It should be noted
that the land at issue is open country. P Ex.'s 8-13. Further, this evidence actually
supports the fact that the East Road is heavily traversed. As a result, Plaintiffs argument
in regard to this testimony is nonsensical and should be disregarded as supplying any
support that the East Road is not the most traversed road.
Finally, Plaintiff appears to argue that the fact that Mr. Robison "described himself
as a 'good friend' of the Defendant who has known the Defendant 'since high school,'
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some 'twenty, thirty years'," indicates that Mr. Robison's testimony should have been
disregarded in some degree by the trial court. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11 & R. at 485: 7, 9
and 11. The trial court was aware of Mr. Robison's relationship with Defendants and
undoubtedly weighed that aspect when determining the weight to assign Mr. Robison's
testimony. Further, it should also be noted that Plaintiff relies heavily on the testimony
of Plaintiff s witness, Glayde Edwards. Mr. Edwards is now the Guardian ad Litem for
Plaintiff. See R. at 231-232. Under Plaintiffs reasoning, Mr. Edwards' testimony should
then similarly be disregarded.
4.

PLAINTIFF'S CITATIONS TO THE TESTIMONY OF GLAYDE
EDWARDS SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT AS
INCONSEQUENTIAL SINCE THE TESTIMONY DOES NOTHING
MORE THAN SHOW THAT THERE WAS CONTRARY EVIDENCE
PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT, AND DOES NOT SHOW THAT
"CLEAR ERROR" WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
IT FOUND THE EAST ROAD WAS THE MOST TRAVERSED ROAD.
Plaintiff also cites to some of the testimony of Glayde Edwards, which Plaintiff

implicitly contends shows that the trial court committed clear error in finding that the
East Road was the most traversed road. See Br. of Aplt. at 11. All that the excerpts from
Glayde Edwards' testimony show is that, not surprisingly, there was contrary evidence
regarding the appropriate location of the easement. As was stated above, the mere fact
that there is contradictory evidence does not give a reviewing court the right to overturn a
trial court's decision since the trial court "is free to weigh the conflicting evidence
presented and to draw its own conclusions." Pierce, 722 P.2d at 782. Plaintiffs
argument appears to be simply that the trial court resolved contradictory evidence against
Plaintiffs position, so the decision should be overruled. What has been presented is
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simply not enough to show clear error, therefore, the trial court's determination must
stand.
5.

PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARIZING PARAGRAPH DRAWS UNSUPPORTED
CONCLUSIONS AND SHOULD BE IGNORED BY THIS COURT.
Plaintiffs concluding paragraph at the end of Point II of Plaintiff s brief, draws

unsupported conclusions and should be ignored. See Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. Plaintiff
argues that "Defendants offered no evidence that any truck could use the East Road to
travel to Plaintiffs' [sic] property." Br. of Aplt. at 11. However, when asked if the
vehicles on the East Road were "like four-wheelers/' Mr. Robison answered, "No,
they're cars or pickups . . . [o]r bigger trucks." R. at 490: 14-19. Plaintiff next states that
no witness testified "to ever having seen a truck travel on the bulk of the East road." Br.
of Aplt. at 11. This point is not only irrelevant, but misstates the testimony presented,
and does not support Plaintiffs contention that the East Road is not the most traversed
road. Plaintiff seems to be arguing that because a witness did not testify that he had seen
a truck travel a substantial distance that the trial court could not have found the East Road
was the most traversed. Such argument is nonsensical. Either the road was traversed or
it was not. Finally Plaintiff states that because Mr. Robison used the term "chased
around" to describe traffic, that the vehicles must have been "light vehicles of a
recreational nature (ATV's for example)." Br. of Aplt. at 12. This argument is selfserving and lacks foundation, especially in light of Mr. Robison's testimony that the
vehicles on the road were "cars or pickups . . . [o]r bigger trucks." R. at 490: 14-19.
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B.

THE RECORD ALSO SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
NOT TO ALLOW AN EASEMENT ON THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD.
Plaintiff argues in his "Point III" that the Gravel Pit Road is the only road that

could provide reasonable access to Plaintiffs property for the gravel hauling and mining
purposes that Plaintiff has contemplated. See Br. of Aplt. at 12. The determination of the
trial court that Plaintiff could get reasonable access to his property on the East Road is a
question of fact, and must therefore be examined under a "clear error" standard, and
"[f)or a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made
by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). Further, for Plaintiff to succeed, he "must show that the
findings are 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ or the appellate court must reach a
'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made'." Power Systems, 765 P.2d
at 9. Quite simply, Plaintiff has once again failed to satisfy these requirements, as can be
seen by examining each of Plaintiff s contentions.
First, Plaintiff states that his "stated purposes of access are to haul gravel and
conduct mining operations." Br. of Aplt. at 12. In regard to Plaintiffs stated purposes,
the trial court found that "[w]hile Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine,
haul sand and gravel, build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented
also showed that Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these
desires a reality by obtaining the required permits, or entering into contracts." R. at 163164: f 7. To support this finding, the trial court was presented with evidence indicating,
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for example, that Plaintiff had failed to plan for tanks, pipelines, processing plaints, and
other provisions, and had failed to obtain any of the necessary licenses for building
structures on the property, or obtain necessary permits for removing sand and gravel, or
conducting mining operations. See R. at 429-433, 472-473 and 474-476. Therefore,
Plaintiffs "stated purposes" should be viewed with some skepticism by this Court.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the Gravel Pit Road is the only suitable road for an
easement because the East Road "does not support heavy vehicular traffic." Br. of Aplt.
at 12. Plaintiff then cites to his arguments made in Plaintiffs Point II. Defendants do not
believe it necessary to restate what has already been argued above in Defendants' section
I (A) regarding Plaintiffs Point II. However, it bears repeating that Mr. Robison testified
that he had seen "cars or pickups . . . [o]r bigger trucks" traveling on the East Road. R. at
490: 14-19.
Third, Plaintiff argues that the Gravel Pit Road is the only convenient access to
Plaintiffs property because it is closer to an "oiled road" than the East Road. See Br. of
Aplt. at 12. Initially, it should be noted that the portion of the Gravel Pit Road leading
from the gravel pit is rough and it would be extremely difficult to move vehiclesfromthe
road onto Plaintiffs property. R. at 491: 23-25 and 492: 1-10. Further, Plaintiff s
reasoning on this issue isflawedbecause Plaintiff is presenting this fact in isolation.
With regard to the placement of easements, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n
construing any grant of right of way the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as
is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to
the servient estate as possible for the use contemplated." Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127,
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1133 (Utah 1916). Plaintiff attempts to argue convenience without giving due
consideration to minimizing the burden to Defendants. Por example, Plaintiff gives no
consideration at this juncture to the findings of the trial court that there had been several
incidences of trespassing on Defendants' property, some of these involving Plaintiff,
which could be more easily prevented by placing the easement on the East Road. See R.
at 157: \ 8 and 163: ^f 5. Nor does Plaintiff consider that there have been problems with
individuals stealing sand and gravel from Defendants' property, which again, is more
easily dealt with by placing the easement on the East Road. See R. at 157: f 8 and 163: f
5.
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the Gravel Pit Road is the only convenient location for
an easement because it is a well maintained road. See Br. of Aplt. at 13. Without
restating the argument discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph, Plaintiff has
once again failed to acknowledge the problems with the portion of the Gravel Pit Road
leading away from the gravel pit, or consider the detriment to the dominant estate. See
Morris, 161 P. at 1133. Additionally, Plaintiffs argument contravenes the finding made
by the trial court that "[t]here is no defined road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit
because it constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit to
remove sand and gravel," and that "[a] substantial amount of work would be required to
place a permanent road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for
the kind of equipment and trucks Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit
onto the North West comer of Plaintiff s property." R. at 157-158: \ 10-11.
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Pifth, Plaintiff states that the Gravel Pit Road "was used so extensively that in
1999 a public hearing was held to determine whether or not the road was in fact a county
road/' citing to the ruling of the trial court. Br. of Aplt. at 13. Plaintiff has misstated
what the trial court ruled. What the trial court did state in its ruling regarding this hearing
was "[i]n 1999, as contentions regarding trespassers and access to Plaintiffs property
through Defendants' property began to rise, a hearing was held by the Millard County
Commission regarding Defendants' property and the Gravel Pit Road." R. at 146: f 9.
Further, "[fallowing the meeting, Le Ray G. Jackson, the Millard County Attorney, sent
a letter to Jack McBride regarding the Gravel Pit Road, stating that the Gravel Pit Road is
not a county road." R. at 146: f 9. What Plaintiff has unfairly characterized as "use" is
in fact a rampant problem of trespassing. As a result, this Court should disregard
Plaintiffs argument as to the 1999 hearing.
Sixth, Plaintiff points the proffered testimony of Clifford Cartwright that the cost
for improving, what Plaintiff labels the North Road, would cost $24,000.00, and that a
roadfromthe east would cost double that. See Br. of Aplt at 13. Dining the trial, the
court was presented with evidence from several sources regarding the condition of all the
roads, much of which has been presented previously. Evidence presented by one side
was on occasion contradictory to evidence presented by another. This Court should bear
in mind that the Utah Supreme Court has stated the trial court "is free to weigh the
conflicting evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions." Pierce, 722 P.2d at
782. Clifford Cartwright's testimony was proffered in the final moments of trial, without
any opportunity for cross examination. See R. at 548: 1-25 and 549: 1-15. However, the
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trial court considered it in light of all the other evidence presented at trial, and gave it its
due weight. Such decision is well within the province of the trial court's discretion.
Seventh, Plaintiff mischaracterizes Mr. Robison's testimony, stating that Mr.
Robison "testified that the final stretch of the East Road was 'possible but its [sic] just
really rough'." Br. of Aplt. at 13 & R. at 492: 5. This testimony was in fact in regard to
the portion of the Gravel Pit Road leading to Plaintiffs property. Mr. Robison was asked
"Mr. Robison, you testified that you've had a frontend loader and a truck up to the gravel
pit. Is it possible to take your frontend loader or the, or your truck from the gravel pit to
the Terrell property on the road that currently exists there?" R. at 491: 23-25 and 492: 12. To which Mr. Robison responded "[w]ell, I'd hate to drive it," further, "[i]t's possible
but it's, it's just really rough," and finally, "I think it would take a four-wheel-drive to get
out of the gravel pit to get up on [Plaintiffs property]." R. at 492: 3, 5 and 9-10. Since
Plaintiff has misrepresented Mr. Robison's testimony, his argument should be
disregarded by this Court.
Finally, Plaintiff cites to the testimony of Glade Edwards and his opinion
regarding the condition of the East Road and Gravel Pit Road and argues "the repair or
construction of the East Road for Plaintiffs purposes is not feasible because the East
Road traverses the property of third parties who are not parties to this action." See Br. of
Aplt. at 13-14. Plaintiff again falls short of his duty to muster an appropriate amount of
evidence to show clear error. Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,' or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made'." Power Systems, 765 P.2d at 9. What Plaintiff has
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provided is an instance where there was contradictory evidence, which was considered by
the trial court, and ultimately dismissed as unpersuasive. Therefore, the evidence
Plaintiff has presented, falls well short of satisfying the standard required to overturn the
trial court's findings regarding the condition of the roads at issue in this matter.
C.

THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONCLUSION THAT THE EASEMENT COULD NOT BE PLACED ON
THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD BECAUSE IT WOULD PRESENT AN
EXCESSIVE BURDEN TO DEFENDANTS5 PROPERTY.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court has committed clear error in its finding that

placing the easement on the Gravel Pit Road would create too much of a burden on
Defendants' property. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-15. The applicable law remains the same,
specifically, "[f]or a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination."
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-936. Further, Plaintiff "must show that the findings are 'against
the clear weight of the evidence,' or the appellate court must reach a 'definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made'." Power Systems, 765 P.2d at 9. Plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the heavy burden for this issue as well. Each of Plaintiff s points are
discussed below.
Plaintiff argues that the findings pertaining to the detriment to Defendants'
property are not supported by the record. See Br. of Aplt. at 14. There was ample
testimony regarding this problem. For example, the Millard County Sheriff, Ed Phillips
stated that he had seen 'no trespassing' signs along Defendants' property for "[a]s long as
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I've known anything or paid any attention to that property which would at least go back
into the early 1960s," and that he had received complaints from Defendant Jack McBride
regarding trespassing on the property, and on one occasion the Plaintiff was involved. R.
at 499: 13-21, 501: 5-8 and 504: 22-25. Sheriff Phillips also testified that he had "seen
evidence of teenagers being in the gravel pit." R. at 508: 12-13. Also, there was
testimony regarding theft from Defendants' gravel pit. R. at 529: 5-6 and 538: 2-6.
With regard to the devaluation of Defendants' property, Plaintiff argues that "[n]o
evidence was offered that Defendants' property value would decrease by permitting
Plaintiff access through the Gravel Pit Road." Br. of Aplt. at 14-15. Plaintiffs assertion
is incorrect. The record clearly indicates that Defendant Jack McBride testified directly
on this issue. Specifically, Defendant Jack McBride was asked "if there is access across
your property, if the access, if an easement were granted right to the middle of your
property would that make your property in your opinion less valuable?" R. at 539: 6-10.
To which, Defendant McBride answered "[l]ess valuable for the future." R. at 539: 11.
Plaintiffs counsel made no objection to the testimony, so it can be assumed Plaintiffs
counsel did not have an issue with this testimony becoming part of the record. The law
pertaining to objections is clear, "[a]bsent a timely objection, we will review an alleged
error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain error'." State v.
Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff has not alleged plain error, so this
Court must disregard any arguments by Plaintiff relating to foundation.
Plaintiff argues incorrectly that it is significant that (a) Defendants allowed Mr.
Robison to use the Gravel Pit Road when he picks up gravel, (b) that the current use of
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the Gravel Pit Road closely resembles Plaintiffs "stated" use of transporting sand and
gravel, and (c) that Plaintiff would maintain the Gravel Pit Road, benefiting Defendants.
See Br. of Aplt. at 15. First, the fact that Defendants allow Mr. Robison, or any other
party who has permission to pick up and transport sand and gravel, is irrelevant as to the
placement of the easement. As it currently stands, Defendants control who moves across
their property along the Gravel Pit Road and who removes sand and gravel from their
property. As was discussed above, one problem with placing the easement on the Gravel
Pit Road are the obstacles for Defendants in trying to prevent trespass and theft. Placing
the easement on the Gravel Pit Road aggravates these problems and is a different
situation entirely than controlling, by granting permission, who has the ability to move
from the gravel pit and use the Gravel Pit Road. Second, the road to the gravel pit is the
only portion of the road that is maintained. The rest of the road, which eventually leads
to Plaintiffs property, is steep and difficult to traverse. Third, as to Plaintiffs contention
that an easement on the Gravel Pit Road would benefit Defendants because Plaintiff
would have to help maintain the road, such a claim is not supported by the record.
Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the benefits to Defendants that would be
present from Plaintiff purportedly maintaining a portion of the Gravel Pit Road. As such,
Plaintiffs argument must be disregarded by this Court.
Finally, Plaintiff states his concerns surrounding "third-party owners of property
surrounding the East Road." Br. of Aplt. at 15. Plaintiff states that these property owners
have "not previously allowed heavy equipment to traverse their property." Br. of Aplt. at
15. There is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiffs statement, it is a baseless
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assertion and should be ignored. Further, Plaintiff states that these property holders
"would actually suffer a greater burden than the Defendants in this case." Br. of Aplt. at
15. Once again, Plaintiff has included an assertion in his brief that is not supported by
any evidence on the record. Therefore, this statement should similarly be disregarded by
this court. Plaintiff also attempts to advocate what he feels are the concerns of these third
party owners. It is inappropriate for Plaintiff to do so and his statements concerning the
burden to third party property owners along the East Road should be ignored by this
Court.
D.

PLAINTIFF'S "POINT V" SHOULD BE IGNORED BY THIS COURT
SINCE
IT IS MERELY
A
SELF-SERVING
CONCLUSION
REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED RELIEF.
Plaintiffs "Point V" is merely a conclusion regarding Plaintiffs requested relief

that repeats what has akeady been stated, and fails to add anything to the arguments
akeady made and should be disregarded. See Br. of Aplt. at 16. Plaintiff fkst repeats the
argument that was set forth in Point I of Plaintiff s brief, specifically, that the trial court
failed to balance its findings of what was reasonably necessary and convenient to the
dominant estate against the burden to the servient estate. See Br. of Aplt. at 16.
Defendants have already argued in then fkst section of argument the failure of Plaintiff to
prove his point. Defendants will not reiterate at this time what has akeady been
adequately briefed in response above. Plaintiff next argues essentially that the evidence
presented to the trial court shows that Plaintiff was entitled to an easement through the
Gravel Pit Road. Defendants have also dealt extensively with this argument in sections
A, B, and C of their brief, and of course, disagree with Plaintiffs conclusion. Finally,
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Plaintiff states that whether or not the trial court correctly weighed the competing
interests of the servient and dominant estates "is a mixed question of fact and law, and
the Court should use the standard of clear error for review of the findings involved and
should review the conclusions of the trial court for correctness." Br. of Aplt. at 16.
While Defendants agree that the appropriate standard of review is clear error, there is no
legal authority cited by Plaintiff for the above assertion that this issue is a mixed question
of fact and law, and Plaintiffs argument in this regard should be ignored.
II.

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF WAS PROPER SINCE THE RECORD CLEARLY SHOWS
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE SUPPLIED AT TRIAL.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it determined that Plaintiff was not

entitled to damages. See Br. of Aplt. at 17. With regard to a trial court's award of
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[b]ecause the adequacy of damages is a
question of fact, [a reviewing court] cannot overturn the trial court's findings unless they
are clearly erroneous." In re Estate of Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969, 981
(Utah 1996). Further, "[f]or a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the
factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record,
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-936. This policy is in place because a trial court
judge is "considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to
derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to
gamer from a cold record." Id. at 936.
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In this matter, the trial court noted in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
that "[w]hile Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and gravel,
build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that
Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality
by obtaining the required permits, or entering into contracts." R. at 163-164: ^ 7.
Testimony presented during trial clearly indicates that the trial court's decision is
supported by the record. Specifically, testimony indicated that Plaintiff had not made
provisions for tanks, communication lines, pipelines, processing plants, or reservoirs; nor
had Plaintiff determined if he would be removing enough mineral or rock products from
his property to qualify as commercial quantities; neither had Plaintiff conducted any
preliminary analysis to determine what amount, if any, is necessary to post a bond for
reclamation purposes. R. at 429-433,472-473 and 474-476. Plaintiff also had not
entered into any agreements with any person or entity to sell the sand, gravel, or other
minerals that may be located on his property. See R. at 466: 24-25 and 467: 1-3. Further,
testimony revealed that no one had been to Plaintiffs property, and determined what the
costs for, or even the possibility of, moving trucks on and off of Plaintiff s property
would be. See R. at 471: 10-20. In addition, in order to remove sand and gravel or
conduct mining operations on Plaintiffs property, a conditional use permit would be
required from Millard County since Plaintiffs property is located in a Range and Forest
Zone. See R. at 474. However, at the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on
Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional use permit with the Millard
County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to mine minerals on Plaintiffs
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property or to take sand and gravel from his property. See R. at 475-476. Plaintiff
complains that he had obtained materials to build structures on the property. However,
while a building permit is required to construct any structures on Plaintiffs property, at
the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an
application for a building permit with Millard County. See R. 476 and 478: 7-13.
Finally, Plaintiff presented no evidence indicating that the materials he had purchased
could not still be used, or had somehow been damaged or ruined.
Clearly the trial court had ample evidence to determine that Plaintiff had simply
failed to present adequate evidence warranting a damages award. As a result Plaintiffs
arguments regarding damages, and whether Plaintiff had taken substantial steps on
Plaintiffs part to convert the property for economic use, are reduced merely to a
disagreement with the trial court over how the evidence was interpreted, weighed and
ultimately ruled upon. See Br. of Aplt. at 17. Plaintiff simply has failed to muster
adequate evidence to show that the "findings made by the trial court are not adequately
supported by the record." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. Therefore, the trial court's decision
declining to award damages to Plaintiff must stand.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellees respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial court must be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7

day of October, 2005.

SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation

j|ALL R. SMART
Attorney for Appellees
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FedEx, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
Attorney at Law
123 East 100 North, First Floor
P.O. Box 67
Payson,Utah 84651

- i ^ ^ — •
Assistant
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ADDENDUM "A

CLERK OF THI FOURTH JUDICIAL
OlSTft^jfrQUfiT

OU HAY t P AH 9« 3 3
IN THE F O U R T H JUDICIAL DISTWQ^GitftflBtRTY
WASATCH COUNTY, STATF, OFTTTAH
CLERK
,^$ -^n, rDEPUTYmiTv

]

STEPHEN GUY TERRELL by and
through his Guardian ad Litem CLARK
WALTERS TERRELL,

RULING
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 020700057

JACK E.McBRIDE and

Judge Donald J. Eyre

EDNAS.McBRJDE.
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on a bench trial held March 4, 2004 and March 29,
2004. Evidence was presented to the Court by witness testimony, documents, and oral argument
from counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter under advisement. The
Court now issues the following:
FACTUAL SUMMARY
1

Plaintiff Stephen Guy Terrell is the owner of a 40-acre parcel of real property

located in Section 10, Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian and further
described as follows*
Southwest Quarter (SW1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE1/4) of Section 10(10)
in Township Twenty-one (21) South Range Five (5) West, Salt Lake Meridian.
Plaintiffs family acquired the property at issue in 1955 from the United States of America as part
of Utah State School and Institutional Trust Lands, and it was transferred to Plaintiff in 1998.
2.

Family members of Defendant Jack E McBride acquired property adjacent to
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; n T Q ^ frnm t ^ e United States of America Defendants' property now

borders Plaintiffs property on the North, West, and East.
3.

Defendant Jack E. McBride has built fences bordering Plaintiffs property on the

North and West. When originally placed, the fence posts for the North fence encroached slightly
onto Plaintiffs property. Once Defendant Jack E. McBride was notified of this, he pulled the
posts immediately and placed the fence on his own property, three feet behind his property line.
Defendant Jack E. McBride built the North and West fences in December of 2002. These fences
have left Plaintiffs property land locked and have forcibly prevented him from accessing his
property.
4.

Locks have been placed on the gates to regulate access to Defendants' property.

cc

No Trespassing" signs have also been placed along Defendants' property gates to warn the

public that the property is private. Sheriff Phillips' testimony corroborated the fact that
Defendants' property has had <cNo Trespassing" signs posted since the early 1960s and that the
gate in question has generally been locked.
5.

Defendant Jack E. McBride has forced hunters and other trespassers to leave if

they are found on his property. Defendants have gone to great lengths to keep individuals from
trespassing on their private property and have never left it open for public use. Despite these
efforts, on many occasions, individuals have cut the locks on Defendants' gates or stole the "No
Trespassing" signs.
6.

There is a large sand gravel pit located on Defendants' property. Over the years,

Defendants have entered into agreements for profit with the State of Utah, Millard County,
private companies, and individuals to remove sand and gravel from Defendants' sand and gravel
pit. In the past, as the State of Utah and Millard County removed sand and gravel, they graded
the road leading into the sand and gravel pit in order to protect the large trucks that were being
used to haul out material from Defendants' sand and gravel pit, but otherwise have provided no
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maintenance of said road. Neither the State, nor Millard County, has ever maintained any other
road located on Defendants5 property. There was no testimony that the State or Millard county
ever created the Gravel Pit Road to provide access to the public across Defendants' property.
7.

When the agreements to remove sand and gravel were made, Defendants provided

access to the sand and gravel pit through a gate that runs along the western border of Defendants'
property, to the east of State Road 100 (SR100). At the time of the 1955 conveyances, this route
from SR100 to the gravel pit property was the most commonly used road to remove gravel and
other materials from the property. After the conveyance, this road was used by visitors to
Plaintiffs property. There are also other less established paths from Plaintiffs property from
Defendants' property.
8.

Defendants have also had to contend with individuals stealing sand and gravel from

the pit when Defendants are unable to monitor their property. Defendant Jack E McBride has
caught Plaintiff and others trespassing on his property in the past. As a result, Defendants have
contacted the Sheriffs Office in Millard County. Deputies responded at least one time and talked
with Plaintiff telling him to stay off of Defendants' property, but they have never arrested Plaintiff.
On one other occasion, Defendant Jack E. McBride caught Plaintiff trespassing on his property
and asked him to leave, at which point Plaintiff acknowledged that he knew he should not be there
and stated he would leave the property.
9.

In 1999, as contentions regarding trespassers and access to Plaintiffs property

through Defendants' property began to rise, a hearing was held by the Millard County
Commission regarding Defendants' property and the Gravel Pit Road. Following the meeting, Le
Ray G. Jackson, the Millard County Attorney, sent a letter to Jack McBride regarding the Gravel
Pit Road, stating that the Gravel Pit Road is not a county road.
10.

There is no defined road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit because it

AA

constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit to remove sand and
gravel. There is a road from the South East portion of Defendants' sand and gravel pit leading
into Plaintiffs property, which has always been in poor condition. It would be extremely difficult
to move a front-end loader or truck from Defendants' sand and gravel pit up to Plaintiffs
property on this particular road.
11.

A substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road

through Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and trucks
Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West corner of Plaintiff s
property. If an easement were granted on the Gravel Pit Road, it would greatly diminish the
future value of Defendants' property and it would make it much more difficult for Defendants to
prevent theft of their sand and gravel and keep trespassers off their property.
12.

Several other roads traverse the properties owned by Defendants and Plaintiff.

Aside from the Gravel Pit Road, only two other roads could provide access to Plaintiffs property.
North of the Gravel Pit Road, is a road that served as the main ingress and egress to Defendants'
property from the west in the past. That road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has not served
as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962 to 1963, when
the Gravel Pit Road was built. It would require a fair amount of work be done to allow the large
trucks and equipment that Plaintiff will need to bring onto his property to conduct mining
operations.
13.

The North West Road goes around Defendants' sand and gravel pit and would

allow egress and ingress to Plaintiffs property from the South East corner of Defendants'
property. The third road providing access to Plaintiffs property, would allow access from the
East off of McBride Lane, and crosses the South East corner of Defendants' property. It is the
Defendants' contention that the East Road is less steep than the Gravel Pit Road, but this fact is
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disputed by Plaintiff. It was the Plaintiffs position that it would be prohibitive and expensive to
upgrade said road, which was also the position of Defendants to improve the road from the gravel
pit to Plaintiffs property.
14.

From 1955 to the present, the only activities conducted on Defendants' property

were dumping bones from the meat packing plant located in Fillmore on Defendants' property,
and occasional visitsfromPlaintiffs family and guests. For the past twenty years Clark Walters
Terrell only visited Defendants' property once a year. Plaintiff is 72 years old, is a disabled
veteran, and his only income comes from the government in the form of disability payments
15.

Defendants' have not given an easement to anyone either verbally or in writing.

16.

Plaintiff intends to conduct some form of mining and hauling of sand and gravel

from his propeity. Plaintiff has obtained a Mineral Lease in 1999 to perform such activities on his
property and has had some samples from his property analyzed. This lease is in addition to his
owner's right to remove common sand and gravel from the property.
17.

Plaintiff obtained a well permit for the subject property in 2001. The well permit

number is 67-1170(A70205) and has been filed with the State of Utah Department of Natural
Resources Division of Water Rights. Plaintiff has until December 31, 2005 to provide Proof of
Beneficial Use of said water. There was an error in the legal description of the well, but that error
has been corrected.
18.

Plaintiff spent money in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction materials

for a structure on the property which he claims he has been unable to use since being locked out
of his property by Defendants in 1999. Plaintiff spent the following:

Rollins Mechanical
Dutson Machine
Mack's

$11,569.41
$4,000.00
$12,000.00

steel I and H beams
equipment, scraper and loader
two tractors and engine repair on boom truck
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Aurora Welding

$1,185.00

steel I and H beams

Metal Mart

$5,000.00

steal beams and tubing

Piute Trailer

$4,000.00

steel beams and pipe

$37,754.41

Total
19.

However, Plaintiff has not made provisions for tanks, communication lines,

pipelines, processing plants, or reservoirs.

Plaintiff has not determined if he will be removing

enough mineral or rock products from his property to qualify as commercial quantities. Plaintiff
has not conducted any preliminary analysis to determine what,amount, if any, is necessary to post
a bond for reclamation purposes. Plaintiff has not entered into any agreements with any person or
entity to sell the sand, gravel, or other minerals that may be located on his property. No evidence
was presented indicating anyone had been to Plaintiffs property and determined what the costs
for, or possibility of moving trucks on and off of Plaintiff s property.
20.

In order to remove sand and gravel or conduct mining operations on Plaintiff's

property, a conditional use permit would be required from Millard County since Plaintiffs
property is located in a Range and Forest Zone. At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff nor anyone
on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional use permit with the Millard County
Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to mine minerals on Plaintiffs property. At the time
of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional
use permit with the Millard County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to take sand and
gravel from his property.
21.

A building permit is required to construct any structures on Plaintiffs property.

At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf had filed an application for a
building permit with Millard County.
22.

In March 2002, Plaintiff filed this action claiming access right (1) under a

Q

declaration of public access, (2) easement by way of necessity or by implication, and/or (3)
easement by prescription Plaintiff also sought damages for Defendants' forcible detainer.
Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking treble damages on prejudgment interest on monies spent in 1998
and 1999, which totals $59,935.11, survey costs of $800, attorney's fees of $7,096.00, and costs
of $153.00.
RULING
Public Access
In order to succeed on a claim of public access, the Plaintiff must show that roadways on
Defendants5 property are open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the Defendants.
Utah Code Section 72-5-101 The only evidence of public use of roadways on Defendants'
property was the evidence of trespassers However, the Court finds that Defendants have taken
reasonable measures to prevent trespassers from enter their property. Therefore, this Court finds
that defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that any roadway on Defendants3 property is
open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the Defendants, and the Court denies
Petitioner's public access claim.
Easement by Prescription
In order to succeed on a claim of easement by prescription, the Plaintiff must show that
there was open, notorious, and adverse use of a roadway for a period of at least twenty (20)
years. Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah App. 1994). It is clear to the Court that Plaintiflf
and his family occasionally visited Defendants' property and dumped bones on the property over
30 years ago There was also testimony that Plaintiffs family occasionally used the road from
SRI 00 to the sand pit However, even if the Court found that this minimal use met the
requirements of prescriptive easement, the Court could only grant access consistent with
Plaintiffs prior use, and the Court can not enlarge that use to accommodate Plaintiffs desire to
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start his own gravel pit. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a sufficient continuous
use of a roadway for at least a twenty (20) year period and denies Petitioner's easement by
prescription claim.
Easement by Necessity
In order to succeed on a claim of easement by necessity, the Plaintiff must show a unity of
title was followed by severance; the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of
severance; the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and the
use of the easement was continuous and self acting, as distinguished from one used only from time
to time when occasion arises. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916); Savage v. Nielsen, 197
P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948). In this case, the evidence presented established that there had been a
unity of title followed by severance and that an easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment
of the dominant estate because Plaintiffs property is landlocked.
However, this does not give Plaintiff the right to choose the location of his easement
across Defendants property. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916). In construing any
grant of right of way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary
and convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible
for the use contemplated. Id
In this case, the evidence presented was that the East Road is the roadway that would
provide the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs estate and the lease burdensome to Defendants'
estate because it is the most traversed road, it is set far enough back from Defendants' property to
present the least amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants' estate, and placing the
easement on the East Road will make it easier for Defendants to prevent trespassing on their
property and theft from their sand and gravel pit. Additionally, the Defendants agreed that they
would permit an easement across their property via the East Road.
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Forcible Detainer
Plaintiff has brought a forcible detainer cause of action under Utah Code Section 78-36-2
because Defendants blocked all roads and paths precluding Plaintiffs from accessing their
property. It is clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land. However, the
Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with enough evidence for the Court to award damages
under this cause of action.
While Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and gravel, build
structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that Plaintiff had failed
to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality by obtaining the required
permits, or entering into contracts. Therefore, the Court will not award damages to the Plaintiff.
Additionally, the Court declines to award attorney's fees and orders that each side with pay their
own attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Plaintiff is granted an easement by
necessity on the East Road. The Court denies all other claims. Counsel for Plaintiffs is Ordered
to prepare and Order and Judgment, submit it to counsel for Defendants for review, and then to
the Court for execution.

day of May, 2004

DATED this

A -
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Z .1
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FILED
CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK
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OF THE DISTRICT COURT
AUG 2 3 2004
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DEPUTY

Randall R. Smart (#2983)
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation
5295 South Commerce Drive (Suite #200)
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone (801) 747-0647
Facsimile (801) 747-1049
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN GUY TERRELL by and through
his Guardian ad Litem
CLARK WALTERS TERRELL,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
JACK E.McBRTDE and
EDNA S. McBRJDE,

Civil No. 020700057
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.
This matter having come before the Court on a bench trial held March 4,2004 and March
29,2004, evidence having been presented to the Court by witness testimony, documents, and
oral argumentfromcounsel, and the Court having taken the matter under advisement, the Court
now issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Stephen Guy Terrell is the owner of a 40-acre parcel of real property

located in section 10, Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian and further
described as follows:
Southwest Quarter (SW1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE1/4) of Section 10(10) in
Township Twenty-one (21) South Range Five (5) West, Salt Lake Meridian.
Plaintiffs family acquired Hie property at issue in 1955 from the United States of America as
part of Utah State School and Institutional Trust Lands, and it was transferred to Plaintiff in
1998.
2.

Family members of Defendant Jack E. McBride acquired property adjacent to

Plaintiffs property in 1955 from the United States of America. Defendant's property now
borders Plaintiffs property on the North, West, and East.
3.

Defendant Jack E. McBride has built fences bordering Plaintiffs property on the

North and West. When originally placed, the fence posts for the North fence encroached slightly
onto Plaintiffs property. Once Defendant Jack E. McBride was notified of this, he pulled the
posts immediately and placed the fence on his own property, three feet behind his property line.
Defendant Jack E. McBride built the North and West fences in December of 2002. These fences
have left Plaintiffs property land locked and have forcibly prevented him from accessing his
property.
4.

Locks have been placed on the gates to regulate access to Defendants' property.

"No Trespassing" signs have also been placed along Defendants' property gates to warn the

public that the property is private. Sheriff Phillips' testimony corroborated the fact that
Defendants' property has had "No Trespassing" signs posted since the early 1960s and that the
gate in question has generally been locked.
5.

Defendant Jack E. McBride has forced hunters and other trespassers to leave if

they are found on his property. Defendants have gone to great lengths to keep individuals from
trespassing on their private property and have never left it open for public use. Despite these
efforts, on many occasions, individuals have cut the locks on Defendants' gates or stole the "No
Trespassing" signs.
6.

There is a large sand gravel pit located on Defendants' property. Over the years,

Defendants ha^ve entered into agreements for profit with the State of Utah, Millard County,
private companies, and individuals to remove sand and gravel from Defendants' sand and gravel
pit. In the past, as the State of Utah and Millard County removed sand and gravel, they graded
the road leading into the sand and gravel pit in order to protect the large trucks that were being
used to haul out material from Defendants' sand and gravel pit, but otherwise have provided no
maintenance of said road. Neither the State, nor Millard County, has ever maintained any other
road located on Defendants' property. There is no testimony that the State or Millard County
ever created the Gravel Pit Road to provide access to the public across Defendants' property.
7.

When the agreements to remove sand and gravel were made, Defendants provided

access to the sand and gravel pit through a gate that runs along the western border of Defendants'
property, to the east of State Road 100 (SR 100). At the time of the 1955 conveyances, this route
from SR 100 to the gravel pit property was the most commonly used road to remove gravel and
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other materials from the property. After the conveyance, this road was used by visitors to
Plaintiff's property.
8.

Defendants have also had to contend with individuals stealing sand and gravel

from the pit when Defendants are unable to monitor their property. Defendant Jack E. McBride
has caught Plaintiff and others trespassing on his property in the past. As a result, Defendants
have contacted the Sheriff's Office in Millard County. Deputies responded at least one time and
talked with Plaintiff telling him to stay off of Defendants' property, but they have never arrested
Plaintiff. On one other occasion, Defendant Jack E. McBride caught Plaintiff trespassing on his
property and asked him to leave, at which point Plaintiff" acknowledged that he knew he should
not be there and stated he would leave the property.
9.

In 1999, as contentions regarding trespassers and access to Plaintiff's property

through Defendants' property began to rise, a hearing was held by the Millard County
Commission regarding Defendants' property and the Gravel Pit Road. Following the meeting,
Le Ray G. Jackson, the Millard County Attorney, sent a letter to Defendant Jack E. McBride
regarding the Gravel Pit Road, stating that the Gravel Pit Road is not a county road.
10.

There is no defined road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit because it

constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit to remove sand and
gravel. There is a road from the South East portion of Defendants' sand and gravel pit leading
into Plaintiff's property, which has always been in poor condition. It would be extremely
difficult to move a front-end loader or truck from Defendants' sand and gravel pit up to
Plaintiff5 s property on this particular road.
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11.

A substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road

through Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and
trucks Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West corner of
Plaintiff's property. If an easement were granted on the Gravel Pit Road, it would greatly
diminish the future value of Defendants' property and it would make it much more difficult for
Defendants to prevent theft of their sand and gravel and keep trespassers off their property.
12.

Several other roads traverse the properties owned by Defendants and Plaintiff.

Aside from the Gravel Pit Road, only two other roads could provide access to Plaintiff's
property. North of the Gravel Pit road, is a road that served as the main ingress and egress to
Defendants' property from the west in the past. That road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has
not served as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962 to
1963, when the Gravel Pit Road was built. It would require a fair amount of work be done to
allow the large tracks and equipment that Plaintiff will need to bring onto his property to conduct
mining operations.
13.

The North West Road goes around Defendants' sand and gravel pit and would

allow egress and ingress to Plaintiffs property from the South East corner of Defendants'
property. The third road providing access to Plaintiffs property, would allow access from the
East off of McBride Lane, and crosses the South East corner of Defendants' property.
14.

From 1955 to the present, the only activities conducted on Defendants' property

were dumping bones from the meat packing plant located in Fillmore on Defendants' property,
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and occasional visits from PlaintifPs family and guests. For the past twenty years Clark Walters
Terrell only visited Defendants' property once a year.
15.

Plaintiff is 72 years old, is a disabled veteran, and his only income comes from

the government in the form of disability payments.
16.

Defendants' have not given an easement to anyone either verbally or in writing.

17.

Plaintiff intends to conduct some form of raining and hauling of sand and gravel

from his property. Plaintiff has obtained a Mineral Lease in 1999 to perform such activities on
his property and has had some samples from his property analyzed. This lease is in addition to
his owner's right to remove common sand and gravel from the property.
18.

Plaintiff obtained a well permit for the subject property in 2001. The well permit

number is 67-1170(A70205) and has been filed with the State of Utah Department of Natural
Resources Division of Water Rights. Plaintiff has until December 31, 2005 to provide Proof of
Beneficial Use of said water. There was an error in the legal description of the well, but that
error has been corrected.
19.

Plaintiff spent money in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction materials

for a structure on the property that he claims he has been unable to use since being locked out of
his property by Defendants in 1999. Plaintiff spent the following:

Rollins Mechanical

$11,569.41

steel I and H beams

Dutson Machine

$4,000.00

equipment, scraper and loader

Mack's

$12,000.00

two tractors and engine repair 1
on boom truck
|
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Aurora Welding

\ $1,185.00

steel I and H beams

1 Metal Mart

$5,000.00

steel beams and tubing

1

Piute Trailer

$4,000.00

steel beams and pipe

1

Total

$37,754.41

20.

However, Plaintiff has not made provisions for tanks, communications lines,

pipelines, processing plants, or reservoirs. Plaintiff has not determined if he will be removing
enough mineral or rock products from his property to qualify as commercial quantities. Plaintiff
has not conducted any preliminary analysis to determine what amount, if any, is necessary to
post a bond for reclamation purposes. Plaintiff has not entered into any agreements with any
person or entity to sell the sand, gravel, or other minerals that may be located on his property.
No evidence was presented indicating anyone had been to Plaintiff's property and determined
what the costs for, or possibility of moving trucks on and off of Plaintiffs property.
21.

In order to remove sand and gravel or conduct mining operations on Plaintiff's

property, a conditional use permit would be required from Millard County since Plaintiffs
property is located in a Range and Forest Zone. At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone
on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional use permit with the Millard
County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to mine minerals on Plaintiffs property. At
the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on Plaintiff's behalf, had filed an application for a
conditional use permit with the Millard County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to
take sand and gravel from his property.
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22.

A building permit is required to construct any structures on Plaintiff's property.

At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff nor anyone on Plaintiff's behalf had filed an application for a
building permit with Millard County.
23.

In March 2002, Plaintiff filed this action claiming access right (1) under a

declaration of public access, (2) easement by way of necessity or by implication, and/or (3)
easement by prescription. Plaintiff also sought damages for Defendants' forcible detainer.
Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking treble damages on prejudgment interest on monies spent in 1998
and 1999, which totals $59,935.11, survey costs of $800.00, attorney's fees of $7,096.00, and
costs of $153.00.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Public Access
1.

In order to succeed on a claim of public access, the Plaintiff must show that

roadways on Defendants' property are open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the
Defendants. Utah Code § 72-5-101. The only evidence of public use of roadways on
Defendants' property was the evidence of trespassers. However, the Court finds that Defendants
have taken reasonable measures to prevent trespassers from entering their property. Therefore,
this Court finds that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof that any roadway on Defendants'
property is open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the Defendants, and the Court
denies Plaintiff's public access claim.
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Easement by Prescription
2.

In order to succeed on a claim of easement by prescription, the Plaintiff must

show that there was open, notorious, and adverse use of a roadway for a period of at least twenty
(20) years. Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah App. 1994). It is clear to the Court that
Plaintiff and his family occasionally visited Defendants' property and dumped bones on the
property over 30 years ago. There was also testimony that Plaintiffs family occasionally used
the road from SRI 00 to the sand pit. However, even if the Court found that this minimal use met
the requirements of prescriptive easement, the Court could only grant access consistent with
Plaintiffs prior use, and the Court cannot enlarge that use to accommodate Plaintiffs desire to
start his own gravel pit. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a sufficient continuous
use of a roadway for at least a twenty (20) year period and denies Plaintiffs easement by
prescription claim.
Easement by Necessity
3.

In order to succeed on a claim of easement by necessity, the Plaintiff must show a

unity of title was followed by severance; the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the
time of severance; the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate;
and the use of the easement was continuous and self acting, as distinguished from one used only
from time to time when occasion arises. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916); Savage v.
Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117,122 (Utah 1948). In this case, the evidence presented established that
there had been a unity of title followed by severance and that an easement is reasonably
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate because Plaintiffs property is landlocked.
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4.

However, this does not give Plaintiff the right to choose the location of his

easement across Defendants' property. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 11273 1133 (Utah 1916). In
construing any grant of right of way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is
reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the
servient estate as possible for the use contemplated. Id.
5.

In this case, the evidence presented was that the East Road is the roadway that

would provide the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs estate and the least burden to
Defendants' estate because it is the most traversed road, it is set far enough back from
Defendants' property to present the least amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants'
estate, and placing the easement on the East Road will make it easier for Defendants to prevent
trespassing on their property and theft from their sand and gravel pit. Additionally, the
Defendants agreed that they would permit an easement across their property via the East Road.
Forcible Detainer
6.

Plaintiff has brought a forcible detainer cause of action under Utah Code § 78-36-

2 because Defendants blocked all roads and paths precluding Plaintiff from accessing his
property. It is clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land. However, the
Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with enough evidence for the Court to award damages
under this cause of action.
7.

While Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and

gravel, build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that
Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality by

obtaining the required permits, or entering into contracts. Therefore, the Court will not award
damages to the Plaintiff. Additionally, the Court declines to award attorney's fees and orders
that each side pay their own attorney's fees and costs.

DATED this

, 2004.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the

W day of August, 2004,1 served a copy of the

foregoing PINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on the following by
depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
WilfordN. Hansen, Jr.
Attorney at Law
123 East 100 North, First Floor
P.O. Box 67
Payson,Utah 84651

Jack E. McBride
Box 503
Fillmore, Utah 84631
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FILED
COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK
OF THE DISTRICT COURT
AUG 2 3 2004
MILLARD COUNTY

Randall R. Smart (#2983)
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation
5295 South Commerce Drive (Suite #200)
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone (801) 747-0647
Facsimile (801) 747-1049
Attorney for Defendants

KQS DEPUTY

g\sldocs\rasmart\m\mcbnde,jack\boundary & easement.7911 00\oider andjudgmentdoc

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN GUY TERRELL by and through
his Guardian ad Litem
CLARK WALTERS TERRELL,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020700057
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.

JACK E.McBRTDE and
EDNA S. McBRJDE,
Defendants.
On March 4,2004 and March 29,2004, abench trial was held in the above-captioned
matter. Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. was present on behalf of Plaintiff and Randall R. Smart was
present on behalf of the Defendants.
The Court, having considered the relief sought by Plaintiff in his Complaint, and having
heard evidence in the form of witness testimony, documents, and having heard the arguments of
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counsel and for other cause appearing, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
ofLaw, now enters the following Order and Judgment:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is granted an easement by necessity on the East Road, which provides
access to Plaintiffs property from McBride Lane and crosses the North East
corner of Section 10 of Defendants' property.

2.

All other causes of action stated in Plaintiffs Complaint are dismissed with
prejudice.

3.

Each party is responsible fof\their own attorneys' fees and costs.

DATED this if

day of

H

1

^.-

> 2004-

BY

%%^K

'%Xv

IUDGE:

^ - ^ ^ ^ V - v ^ ' / F o i i r t h District Court Judge
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